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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., ) 
a Utah limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff ) 
vs ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah ) 
body politic and political ) 
subdivision of the State ) 
Of Utah, ) Docket No. 20010840-CA 
Defendant ) [Argument priority 15] 
The Plaintiff-Appellant B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
[hereinafter "B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT] submits the following as 
its APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellant is B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability company. 
The Defendant-Appellee SALT LAKE COUNTY is a body 
politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah, 
having primary responsibility to approve real estate 
development within its geographic area. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted 
pursuant to the Order of the Utah Supreme Court "pouring 
over" this case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-2(3)(j), Utah Code . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual and procedural 
situation involving this case) presents the following issues 
for review: 
1. That the location-based not impact-based 
roadway dedication and improvement requirements of 
Salt Lake County are unconstitutionally excessive 
and/or unreasonable, in violation of: 
a. The United States Constitution [the 
"Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and/or the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] , when 
similarly-situated developers created the 
essentially-equal "impact" (in the form 
of vehicle traffic on 3500 South Street) 
but were required, as a condition of 
development approval, to make NO 
improvements or dedications; and/or 
b. The Utah Constitution [Article I, 
Section 22: "takings" clause, and/or 
Article I, Section 24: the "uniform 
operations of laws" provisions]. 
2. Whether or not the trial court properly 
applied the correct procedural standards and 
burdens of proof in adjudicating the case 
involving distinct: 
a. "Federal" law claims; and/or 
b. "State" law claims, 
which have differing "burden of proof" 
requirements for the trial of such claims. 
3. Whether the trial court properly adjudicated 
the Plaintiff's "civil rights claim" [42 U.S.C. 
§1983] based upon the foregoing federal 
"constitutional" violations ["the Takings Clause", 
Equal Protection, etc.] indisputably implemented 
"under color of law" (the County ordinance, 
requiring the location-based rather than 
impact-based roadway dedications and 
improvements). 
4. Whether the trial court properly ruled by 
denying the Plaintiff all economic recovery (for 
inverse condemnation, etc., for the uncompensated 
"taking") when the County's own witnesses an 
"appraiser" testified the value of the roadway 
"taking" was $15,000. 
5. Whether the trial court erred by failing to 
award a "severance damages" recovery based upon 
the diminished "lot yield" directly arising from 
the unreasonable and excessive development 
improvements of the "taking" effected pursuant to 
the County's ordinance. > 
6. Whether the trial court erred in its 
interpretation and application of any "notice of 
claim" requirements, so as to override and 
preclude adjudication of: 
a. The "federal" constitutional claims; 
b. The "state" law constitutional (i.e. 
"self-executing" inverse condemnation) 
claims under Article I, Section 24; 
and/or 
c. The "federal" claims of "civil 
rights violation" under 42 u.S.C. §1983 
and §1988, for which any "notice" 
requirements are not applicable. 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The interpretation and application of provisions of the 
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by 
the trial court are matters of law. The trial court's 
conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for 
correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993); 
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 
1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . 
This standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company 
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P. 2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah \ 
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users' Association vs 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate < 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State 
vs Deli, 861 P. 2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell < 
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1997 the Plaintiff, as the owner of a 15-acre parcel i 
of undeveloped real estate located at approximately 7700 
West 3500 South in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake 
County, proposed to develop the parcel into a single-family , 
residential subdivision known as "Westridge Meadows". The 
Plaintiff applied to Salt Lake County the local government 
having development approval over that area for development 
approval of the proposed subdivision. The proposed 
subdivision was located immediately south of and adjacent to 
3500 South Street actually a state highway under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Department of Transportation 
which had then a pavement half-width of approximately 17 
feet and a daily traffic count of approximately "13,000 
vehicles per day" 
Salt Lake County authorities informed the Plaintiff 
that it would be required to improve "3500 South Street" to 
an improved half-width of 40 feet, which would have a 
traffic count "carrying capacity" to as much as 37,000 
vehicles per day. The proposed subdivision development would 
generate less than 500 "vehicle trips per day". The County-
required improvements mandated that the Plaintiff extend the 
paved surface, install curb and gutter (to handle stormwater 
run-off from areas mostly outside of the proposed 
development) , install underground stormdrain lines (to 
handle stormwaters from areas mostly outside of the proposed 
development) across the entire almost-900' "frontage" of the 
development, install sidewalk and passage-preventing (i.e. 
no gates) fencing across the almost-900' "frontage" along 
3500 South, and to relocate a half-dozen or so existing 
electrical power poles and lines (which generally served 
other areas outside of the subdivision). Additionally, The 
County required the Plaintiff to install the street 
improvements internal to the proposed subdivision, including 
those street improvements to the building lots on the 
northern boundary thereof. The County required "frontage" 
for said lots onto the internal street and effectively 
denied "frontage" onto 3 500 South Street, through the 
required, Developer-installed non-passable fencing installed 
on the edge of the public right-of-way of 3500 South. The 
County also required the developer to dedicate to public use 
those areas of the 3500 South Street which previously had 
been held in private ownership to the centerline of the 
roadway---so improved, to the 40-foot half-width. 
In 1998 Salt Lake County authorities informed the 
Plaintiff that its development would be disapproved unless 
3500 South Street were improved to a 53-foot "half-width" 
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for the public roadway. The net result of requirement to 
develop 3500 South Street to the 53-foot half-width 
effectively took enough real estate that the proposed 
"building lot yield" for the subdivision decreased from 46 
lots to 44 lots representing itself approximately $90,300 
economic loss to the Plaintiff. 
In the spring and early summer of 1998 the Plaintiff 
attempted to administratively resolve the matter, by meeting 
with County officials and ultimately filing a "notice of 
claim" to challenge the County's unconstitutionally-
excessive requirements. In July 1998 the Board of County 
Commissioner's denied without granting a hearing---the 
Plaintiff's "notice of claim" challenge as to the 
unconstitutionally-excessive roadway improvement 
requirements for 3 500 South. In August 1998 the instant 
litigation was filed. 
Notwithstanding the filed litigation, the Plaintiff 
pursued its efforts to obtain the development approval of 
the proposed subdivision. In August 1999 a year AFTER the 
litigation was filed in the district court Salt Lake 
County authorities finally approved the subdivision 
development, which Plaintiff commenced and has essentially 
completed. 
In April 2001 the case was tried in a two-day bench 
trial before the Honorable Timothy R Hanson of the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. In June 2001 
Judge Hanson issued his "Memorandum Decision", ruling 
entirely in favor of Salt Lake County. Plaintiff's suggested 
"findings" were ignored by opposing counsel. The Court 
ultimately entered Judgment on 3 0 July 2001. On August 9th 
the Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial, which was 
effectively resolved by the Court's "Memorandum Decision" 
(of 19 September 2001) and/or the attorney-prepared "Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Enter Additional Findings", 
entered 15 October 2001. 
On 18 October 2001 the Plaintiff filed the "notice of 
appeal". 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant's arguments are summarized as follows: 
1. The District Court erred and misapplied well-
established case law [Nollan, Dolan, Banberry 
Development] and upheld the COUNTY'S location-
based (as constrasted with an impact-based) system 
of requiring developers to make the required 
dedications and in-kind improvements for roadways 
utilized by those developments. 
2. The District Court erred and misapplied the 
distinctive and almost opposite procedural burdens 
of proof pertaining to the "state" and the 
"federal" constitutional claims, by failing to 
require the County to provide some kind of 
"mathematical analysis" as to the "rough 
proportionality" of the required dedication and 
installed improvements, as Dolan requires. 
3 . The District Court erred in failing to award 
the any damages for the "taking", when in fact the 
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County's own witnesses, without rebuttal, 
acknowledged that the Plaintiff's property had 
been taken. 
4. The District Court erred in ruling that the 
Plaintiff's submitted "notice of claim" documents 
preclude recovery. 
ARGUMENT 
I - •'• 
THE Location-based "EXACTION AND DEDICATION" REQUIREMENTS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY VIOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND PROTECTIONS 
AGAINST THE "TAKING" OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF "JUST COMPENSATION" 
A 
IN-KIND "EXACTIONS" AND "IMPACT FEES" 
The Plaintiff, as a developer, recognizes the necessity 
for exactions and for impact fees: such are necessary to 
insure the availability of infrastructure improvements which 
make development possible. Similarly, Plaintiff has no 
complaint that proper planning and prudence dictate that 
public improvements, particularly roadways, be planned for 
"growth" and increased usage. The Plaintiff's chief 
complaint against the Defendant COUNTY is not with the 
"qualitative" issue, but rather with the "quantitative 
issue": namely, that the required in-kind "exactions" are 
unconstitutionally excessive and that "just compensation" 
should have been (and wasn't but now should be) awarded to 
the Plaintiff for such excessive dedications and 
i 
improvements! 
Within the constitutional jurisprudence for "takings" 
cases such as this, two methods have been devised by 
government as a pre-condition to granting of development 
approval to address the "impact" created by new 
development: so-called "impact fees" and in-kind 
"exactions": 
"Impact fees" are essentially cash payments 
required of a developer, the proceeds of which to 
be expended solely on "capital facilities" (as 
contrasted with salaries and for operation and 
maintenance), for the purposes for which they were 
collected. [As adduced by the evidence, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY has NO "ROAD IMPACT FEE". The COUNTY does 
have "impact fee ordinances" for "parks" and for 
"storm sewer (flood-control)" and does collect 
monies from developers ALL developers for such 
capital projects.] Currently, local government 
"impact fees" are regulated by Utah statute. See 
Section 11-36-101 et seq, Utah Code, initially 
adopted in 1995 and applicable to Salt Lake 
County. 
In-kind "exactions", on the other hand, are 
those in-kind improvements (such as roads, 
sidewalks, parks, etc.) required to be installed 
by the developer as a condition of development 
approval. The in-kind "exactions" maybe "on-site" 
(i.e. within the boundaries of the new 
development) or may, in relatively-rare 
situations, be "off-site". 
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The Utah state court cases have generally involved 
"impact fees". On the other hand, the federal appellate 
court decisions (e.g. Nollan and Dolan) have generally 
involved in-kind exactions. Because either method i.e. 
cash payment ("impact fee") or in-kind 
dedication/installation ("exaction") implicates the same 
"constitutional" issue (i.e. "taking or damaging of private 
property without just compensation") , the two issues are 
for constitutional analysis and jurisprudence purposes 
without distinction and are treated equivalently. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized this equivalency in Banberry, 
when the Court quoting from a New Jersey case stated: 
As with water connection fees, the amount of 
such exactions or fees should be such that the 
burden of providing these municipal services 
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly ( 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred." 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. 
B < 
IN-KIND EXACTIONS, NOT BASED UPON "IMPACT" 
BUT BASED INSTEAD STRICTLY UPON "LOCATION", 
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTAL "TAKING" 
During the trial the Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY was < 
as it had to be surprisingly candid in its admission and 
approach to the "core" constitutional issue-at-hand in the 
"takings" (as well as the "equal protection" and "uniform < 
operation of law") claims: namely, that ONLY those parcels 
which are "highway-abutting" (the phraseology utilized in 
Defendant's Memorandum of Law submitted to the District < 
Court) are subject to the in-kind exaction and that 
in 
everybody else whether they create the same "impact" or 
not is exempt from effecting the in-kind dedication. This 
"location-based" approach to the "Takings Clause" (which, 
herein, refers to the corresponding provisions of Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution) claims is facially 
flawed because it not only flies in the face of the 
multitude of court decisions to the contrary, but also flies 
in the face of the Takings Clause itself and the reasons for 
it! The Takings Clause was adopted not merely in the 
abstract because the Framers felt that governments had the 
tendency want in general "private property" for some 
governmentally-justified "public purpose or use"; rather, 
government frequently seemed to want A PARTICULAR PIECE OF 
PROPERTY for some "public purpose", such as a road or a park 
or a reservoir or military base or whatever. In the real 
estate context, IT WAS ALWAYS LOCATION! For "roads", it was-
--for Takings Clause analysis and application ALWAYS A 
LOCATION ANALYSIS: the government wanted to put the road 
"HERE!" whether that be through a farmer's beet field or 
a farmer's residence. It didn't really macter. What did 
matter is that the Takings Clause requires the government to 
PAY FOR IT! 
C 
FEDERAL STANDARD AS TO "TAKINGS" 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt 
3141 (1987) and Dolan vs City of Tigard, 114 SCt 2309 (1994) 
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are THE DEFINITIVE CASES for these "roadway dedication/in-
kind exaction1' claims. 
In Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 
107 SCt 3141 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the "constitutional" issue involved in an "in-kind 
exaction" such as here at hand. The landowner owned a 
beachfront parcel upon which was built a 500-square foot 
bungalow that was dilapidated. The landowner desired to 
demolish the smaller building and construct a 2500-square 
foot residential structure with a two-car garage. His parcel 
lay one-quarter mile south of an oceanside public park with 
public beach and recreation area. Another public beach was 
1800 feet to the south of their parcel. He applied for 
permission to erect the larger structure, but was denied 
development approval unless he granted to the public a 
public access easement across the oceanside end of his 
parcel, upon which the public could traverse his property, 
in getting from one public park to another. Following state 
court decisions favorable to the Coastal Commission, the 
propertyowner appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
which found the requirement to dedicate the "public access" 
easement to violate the United States Constitution. Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, held against the Coastal 
Commission's requirement (for the public easement) and 
wrote: 
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the 
condition and the original purpose of the building ( 
restriction converts that purpose to something 
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite 
simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some 
governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of 
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and 
land use context, this is not one of them. In 
short, unless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid restriction of 
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion. 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. An "out-and-out plan of 
extortion"! are pretty strong words for the United States 
Supreme Court in characterizing local government actions. As 
the "mathematical" applications described herein [in either 
the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact" (defined 
in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly show, the 
"diminimus", almost non-existent "reasonable relationship" 
or "nexus" between the "permit condition" (i.e. the required 
exaction = dedication and improvement) and the impact 
created by the new development is such so as to render the 
exaction constitutionally impermissible! 
In Nollan the Supreme Court continued: 
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to 
be more than a pleading requirement, and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. 
In Nollan the Court REJECTED the idea that the 
governmental permission to develop was a "governmental 
benefit" conferred upon the propertyowner. The Court wrote: 
But the right to build on one's own property 
even though its exercise can be subjected to 
legitimate permitting requirements cannot be 
remotely described as a "governmental benefit". 
And thus the announcement that the application for 
(or granting of) the permit will entail the 
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded 
as establishing a voluntary exchange. 
Footnote at 107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added. 
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309 
(1994), the United States Supreme Court was presented with 
the opportunity to revisit Nollan and to articulate "what is 
the required degree of connection between the exactions 
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the 
proposed development." 114 SCt at 2312. The propertyowner 
operated a hardware store on a 1.6-acre parcel. She desired 
to demolish the smaller building and construct a larger 
building and to install additional parking facilities. City 
ordinances required her to keep at least 15% of the area in 
"open space" or landscaping. The city determined, as a 
condition of the issuance of the building permit, that she 
must also be required to dedicate a public pedestrian or 
bicycle path "walkway" in the flood-plain area of a nearby 
creek. In holding against the municipality, the Court wrote: 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." (quoting Armstrong vs United States) [114 
SCt at 2316. Emphasis added. 
Under the well-settled doctrine of 
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for public 
use in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the property has 
little or no relationship to the benefit. 
114 SCt at 2317. Emphasis added. 
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions 
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the 
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" rii4 
SCt at 2318] , the Court was faced with several legal 
standards. In describing the various standards and in 
adopting a "federal standard" (for Takings Clause) 
purposes), the Court wrote: 
A number of state courts have taken an 
intermediate position, requiring the municipality 
to show a "reasonable relationship" between the 
required dedication and the impact of the proposed 
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 
Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.n2d 297, 301 (1980), where 
that court stated: 
"The distinction, therefore, which must 
be made between an appropriate exercise 
of the police power and an improper 
exercise of eminent domain is whether the 
requirement has some reasonable 
relationship or nexus to the use to which 
the property is being made or is merely 
being used as an excuse for taking 
property simply because at that 
particular moment the landowner is asking 
the city for some license or permit," 
Thus, the court held a city may not require a 
property owner to dedicate property for some 
future public use as a condition for obtaining a 
building permit when such future use is not 
"occasioned by the construction sought to be 
permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N.W.2d, at 302. 
Some form of the reasonable relationship test 
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. 
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic 
differences, general agreement exists among the 
courts "that the dedication should have some 
reasonable relationship to the needs created by 
the [development]." [Citation to authorities 
omitted.] 
I 
We think the "reasonable relationship" test 
adopted by a majority of the states courts is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than { 
either of those previously discussed. But we do 
not adopt it as such, partly because the term 
"reasonable relationship" seems confusingly 
similar to the term "rational basis" which 
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ( 
Amendment. 
We think a term such as "rough 
proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to 
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No 
precise mathematical calculation is required, but 
the city must make some sort of individualized < 
determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development. 
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
other authorities cited in original Supreme Court text 
have been omitted.] The COUNTY'S requirement that the 
Plaintiff install improvements which are in excess of the 
needed improvements projected for more than twenty years 
into the future is certainly constitutionally suspect! 
With respect to the "rough proportionality" required to 
be derived and shown (in a burden-of-proof context) by the 
government, the Dolan court wrote: 
No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some effort to 
quantify its findings in support of the dedication 
for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the 
conclusory statement that it could offset some of 
the traffic demand generated. . . . The city's 
goal of reducing flooding hazards and traffic 
congestion, and providing for public greenways, 
are laudable, but there are outer limits to how 
this may be done. "A strong public desire to 
improve the public condition [will not] warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change," 
114 SCt at 2322. Emphasis added. Citation to cases omitted. 
As early as 198 0 the United States Supreme Court had 
written: 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may 
not transform private property into public 
property without compensation, even for the 
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is 
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That 
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary 
use of governmental power, 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US 
155 at 164, 101 SCt 446 at 452 (1980). Emphasis added. 
Although the Plaintiff DEMANDED, as early as April 
1998, that the COUNTY create and/or provide a copy of the 
written "individualized determination" as to the needs 
created by the Westridge Meadows development and the "rough 
proportionality", the COUNTY failed in this 
"constitutional" per Dolan requirement. The Andrea 
Pullos' "individualized determination" is not what the 
Supreme Court requires; Ms Pullos' calculations are merely 
the self-serving recitation of issues purporting to explain 
the County's perceived needs over time and based upon very 
generalized projections some of which were 22 years "out" 
(i.e. into the future)! 
The Defendant intentionally chose to distract the trial 
court and the District Court succumbed to that 
distraction from the jurisprudential significance of 
Nollan and Dolan by not only addressing directly their 
application, but by citing to OLDER, federal cases which 
have nothing to do with the issues at hand. To the extent 
that Nollan and Dolan are directly on point i.e. they 
involve "takings" of real estate, for "public us." they 
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overrule those earlier cases, implicitly or expressly. And 
to the extent that the Dolan EXPRESSLY REJECTS much of the 
former case law analysis cited and relied upon (in the 
abstract) by the Defendant in its Memorandum of Law. 
The Defendant argued and the District Ccurt 
erroneously agreed---that Nollan and Dolan cases do not 
apply to "roadways" and so they simply don't apply to the 
case at hand! WRONG! ABSOLUTELY WRONG! Roadways whether it 
be 3 500 South or any other public roadway are not unique 
in the "constitutional" sense! What Nollan and Dolan are 
talking about is a CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE: that government 
MAY NOT condition development approval upon the 
uncompensated "taking" of private property for public use, 
unless the "taking" correlates to the impact actually 
created! 
Nolan is NOT merely about some beachfront property and 
the beautiful views which might be enjoyed by members of the 
public as they saunter across a former privately-owned 
beach! Dolan is NOT merely about some little jogging path 
adjacent to a creek, which sometimes overflowed during the 
rainy season. Nollan and Dolan are about CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES which have direct application, FACTUALLY AND 
LEGALLY, to the issues at bar. Nollan would not have a 
different analysis or result had the California requirement 
been phrased "all ocean-abutting properties shall dedicate 
an easement". Dolan would not have had a different analysis 
or result that the City's requirement been phrased "all 
Fanno Creek-abutting properties shall dedicate an easement 
i f t 
. . . » . Nollan and Dolan are THE DEFINITIVE AND DISPOSITIVE 
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS and the principles therein must be 
applied in the case at bar. 
In essence, literally, this case illuminates a 
situation which the United States Supreme Court has 
characterized as the 
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of 
the compensation requirement fof the Takings 
Clause!, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added 
for clarity. 
D 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF "REASONABLENESS" 
UNDER UTAH STATE LAW 
In 1981 almost two decades ago the Utah Supreme 
Court was presented with the case of Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1981). In Banberry a real estate developer challenged 
South Jordan City's required parks and cu]inary water 
connection "impact fees" and "exactions". In resolving the 
legal issue and going to great lengths to establish landmark 
precedence certainly for Utah the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote: 
The Home Builders case established the 
principle upon which the reasonableness of the 
water connection fee in this case should be 
judged. The "fair contribution" of the connecting 
party should not exceed "the expense thereof met 
by others." Or, as the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the 
allocation of improvement costs between city and 
developer would ideally have been such as to 
insure, to the greatest extent practicable, that 
the cost of extending a municipal water facility 
1 Q 
i 
would fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred. They should be sufficiently flexible 
to permit consideration to be given to the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case. 
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. 
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 (1972). 
Therefore, where the fee charged a new subdivision 
or a new property hookup exceeds the direct costs 
incident thereto (as a means of sharing the costs 
of common facilities), the excess must survive 
measure against the standard that the total costs 
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly-
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply with the 
standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee 
related to services like water and sewer must not 
require newly developed properties to bear more 
than their equitable share of the capital costs in 
relation to benefits conferred. 
To determine the equitable share of the 
capital costs to be borne by newly developed 
properties, a municipality should determine the 
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be 
borne by those properties in comparison with the 
other properties in the municipality as a whole; 
the fee in question should not exceed the amount 
sufficient to equalize the relative burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
631 P. 2d at . Emphasis added. The Utah Supreme Court 
continued, by identifying seven criteria to be evaluated to 
determine the "relative burden already borne and yet to be 
borne" by the newly-developed properties. The Court wrote: 
Among the most important factors the municipality 
should consider in determining the relative burden 
already borne and yet to be borne by newly 
developed properties and other properties are the 
following, suggested by the well reasoned 
authorities cited below: 
(1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; 
(2) the manner of financing existing 
capital facilities (such as user charges, 
special assessments, bonded indebtedness, 
general taxes, or federal grants); 
(3) the relative extent to which the 
newly developed properties and the other 
properties in the municipality have 
already contributed to the cost of 
existing capital facilities (by such 
means as user charges, special 
assessments, or payment from the proceeds 
of general taxes); 
(4) the relative extent to which the 
newly developed properties and the other 
properties in the municipality will 
contribute to the cost of existing 
capital facilities in the future; 
(5) the extent to which the newly 
developed properties are entitled to a 
credit because the municipality is 
requiring their developers or owners (by 
contractual arrangement or otherwise) to 
provide common facilities (inside or 
outside the proposed development) that 
have been provided by the municipality 
and financed through general taxation or 
other means (apart from user charges) in 
other parts of the municipality; 
(6) extraordinary costs, if any, in 
servicing the newly developed properties; 
and 
(7) the time-price differential inherent 
in fair comparisons of amounts paid at 
different times. 
631 P. 2d at 903-904. Emphasis added. Citation to supporting 
cases omitted. Criteria #4 and #5 the relative extent to 
which the "new" development is adding to the value of the 
existing facilities is directly pertinent to the situation 
at bar. 
The Utah Supreme Court continued: 
In adjudicating the validity of any 
individual application of this standard of 
reasonableness, the courts must concede 
municipalities the flexibility necessary to deal 
realistically with questions not susceptible of 
exact measurement. Precise mathematical equality 
"is neither feasible nor constitutionally vital." 
Airwick Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage 
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Authority, supra, 270 A. 2d at 26. Similarly, 
municipal officials must also have the legal power 
to deal creatively with extraordinary or 
unforeseen circumstances in the provision of 
municipal services. Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 
Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946). 
. We agree with and adopt the New Jersey 
court's ruling in Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. 
Township of E. Brunswick, supra, 286 A. 2d at 
507-508: 
The rule we lay down must be given a 
pragmatic application. Complete equality 
of treatment may sometimes be impossible, 
especially where a municipality has 
followed no set pattern with respect to 
past extensions.. Nor should a 
municipality be denied the right to 
modify an established pattern where 
altered circumstances reasonably so 
dictate. Equality of treatment may upon 
occasion be forced to give way before 
some supervening public interest. But 
insofar as such equality can reasonably 
be achieved this must be done, 
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Utah 
Supreme Court intends that everyone that is, those 
creating the "impact" should pay, "equally" if possible 
but "almost equally as possible", in any regard! 
The Utah Supreme Court continued: 
Reasonableness obviously holds the 
municipality to a higher standard of rationality 
than the requirement that its actions not be 
arbitrary or capricious. 
Under the reasonableness test in Call v. City 
of West Jordan, supra, the benefits derived from 
the exaction need not accrue solely to the 
subdivision (614 P.2d at 1259); flood control and 
recreation are needs that cannot be treated in 
isolation from the rest of the municipality. At 
the same time, the benefits derived from the 
exaction must be of "demonstrable benefit" to the 
subdivision (Id. at 1259). 
As with water connection fees, the amount of 
such exactions or fees should be such that the 
burden of providing these municipal services 
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
no 
conferred." Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of 
E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred" 
may have a more significant impact on the 
reasonableness of park fees than on water 
connection fees. The central facilities that 
support water and sewer service would generally 
confer the same benefits in every part of the 
municipality, but the benefits conferred by 
recreational, flood control, or other dispersed 
resources may be measurably different in different 
parts of the municipality. Park improvement fees 
should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in 
light of the relative benefits conferred on, as 
well as the relative burdens previously borne and 
yet to be borne by, the newly developed properties 
in comparison with the other properties in the 
municipality as a whole. The fees in question 
should not exceed the amount sufficient to 
equalize the relative benefits and burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
631 P.2d at 905. Emphasis added. Public roadways, like 
"parks", are "dispersed resources". In fact, roadways are 
the most "dispersed", governmentally-owned resources of all. 
Thus, per Banberry, the exactions required of a developer 
for roadways should be 
"equitable in light of the relative benefits 
conferred on, as well as the relative burdens 
borne and yet to be borne by, the newly developed 
properties in comparison with the other properties 
in the municipality as a whole. 
Id. Emphasis added. 
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217 
(Utah Supreme Court 1979) [hereinafter "Call I"], on 
rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 (1980) [hereinafter "Call II"], 
reversed on other grounds 727 P.2d 180 (1986), the Utah 
defined and established the Utah standard as to the 
constitutional validity of "impact fees" (and, implicitly, 
"in-kind exactions") , to be one of "reasonable relationship" 
(that is, there must be a reasonable relationship between 
the needs created by the development and the impact fee (or 
in-kind exaction) required of the developer. 
The COUNTY is similarly prohibited from utilizing the 
"in-kind exaction" to cure pre-existing deficiencies. 
[Raising the "service level" of the 3 500 South roadway from 
its present (1997) "service level D (approaching gridlock)" 
to "service level B (almost free-flowing)" is, in essence, 
"curing the pre-existing deficiency" nevertheless 
unconstitutionally imposed upon the back of a single 
developer, the Plaintiff! 
That government should pay for the additional property 
so acquired (from the existing 1997 paved roadway 
extending 17 feet to the lip of the asphalt paving) is 
mandated by a long line of Utah judicial decisions. See, for 
example, Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 
vs Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah Supreme Court 
1987) [holding that the government must condemn and pay for 
those portions of the intended roadway which are outside of 
that portion of the roadway which might be claimed to be 
public from previous usage]. 
E 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO "SEVERANCE DAMAGES" 
EQUAL TO THE DIFFERENCE IN "LOT YIELD" 
WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN REALIZED IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
BUT FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND EXCESSIVE "TAKING" 
The District Court's misapplication of the 
"constitutional" issues at hand seemingly caused it to 
ignore the Plaintiff's claims for "severance damages", based 
upon the "loss" (i.e. differential) in "lot yield" which 
could have been realized, but for the unconstitutional and 
excessive "taking". [See TRANSCRIPT at pp. 132-133.] 
Numerous other judicial decisions support the 
propertyowner's entitlement to compensation for "takings", 
including "severance damages". See Farmers New World Ins vs 
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990); Colman vs Utah 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Hamblin vs 
Clearfield City, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990); Carpet Barn vs 
State of Utah, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah Ct App 1990); Hansen vs 
Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 838 (Utah 1990) ; and Three-D Corp 
vs Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 1321 (Utah Ct App 1988) . In the 
instant case, the coerced dedication (from the 33-foot 
"half-width" line to the increased 53-foot "half-width" 
line) measured against the almost 900-foot northern 
"frontage" of the Westridge Meadows subdivision, constitutes 
almost 18,000 square feet of additional area. Had this area 
been able to be utilized within the subdivision for "lots", 
TWO ADDITIONAL BUILDING LOTS could have been created. [The 
average "make-up" quantity derived from reconfiguring the 
first 44 lots was a mere 44 square feet (2,000 square feet 
divided by 44 lots). Thus, the coerced "dedication" to the 
53-foot line has "severance damages" against the remaining 
parcel of approximately $90,000: $45,000 for each of two 
"lots" which could have been created and sold, but for the 
coerced dedication. 
The instant situation must also be distinguished from 
the "shopping center development", in which the developer 
might willingly install the widened roadway improvements, if 
only to increase and enhance the commercial potential of the 
larger number of vehicles driving past. In the instant 
"residential" development context, the Plaintiff's interests 
are the exact opposite: residences want privacy and quiet. 
Also distinguishing is the fact that THE COUNTY ALSO MADE 
THE DEVELOPER INSTALL AN ADDITIONAL ACCESS STREET FOR THOSE 
HOMES "BACKING" ONTO 3 500 SOUTH: not only has the Developer 
been required to improve the 53 feet of "half-width" of 3500 
South, but has ALSO BEEN REQUIRED to dedicate and install an 
additional 33-feet of "half-width" (i.e. pavement, curb 
gutter, sidewalk) on the north side of the "internal" (i.e. 
subdivision) street! 
In the instant situation, the Defendant COUNTY has 
singled out the "highway-abutting" propertyowners and made 
them pay 100% of the roadway improvement costs (of 3 500 
South), whereas those "other properties" (such as "Elusive 
Meadows", a similarly-situated single-family residential 
development immediately south of Westridge Meadows and 
utilizing the very Montclair Drive to gain access onto 3500 
South) PAY NOTHING! Banberry requires: 
The fees in question should not exceed the amount 
sufficient to equalize the relative benefits and 
burdens of newly developed and other properties. 
631 P. 2d at 905. Emphasis added. That the Plaintiff paid for 
EVERYTHING in the dedication and improvement of 3 50 0 South 
Street is simply NOT "EQUITABLE". 
II ' 
PERTINENT STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERMINE 
THE COUNTY7S REQUIRED DEDICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
Without digressing from the Plaintiff's 
"constitutional" claims, two Utah statutes have implications 
within this case: if only to negate the COUNTY'S claimed 
reliance on any kind of "legal" justification. 
A 
THE UTAH IMPACT FEES ACT 
The Utah Impact Fees Act, codified at Section 11-36-
101, Utah Code, was first adopted in 1995 and is applicable 
against the COUNTY. Section 11-36-102(13)(a) authorizes the 
imposition and collection of a "roadway impact fee". Yet the 
COUNTY has done nothing. Rather than attempting to 
"equalize" the "relative burden" (per Banberry) which 
everyone pays, the COUNTY persists in its "highway-abutting" 
approach in which a few PAY EVERYTHING and most PAY NOTHING! 
The Impact Fees Act which further undermines the 
COUNTY'S position. Subsection 11-36-102(13) (c) effectively 
precludes, by "definition", the County from calculating, 
assessing and collecting a "road impact fee" which includes 
"state and federal highways" as part of the derivation or 
justification for any "road impact fee". Thus, the COUNTY is 
effectively precluded from utilizing ANY road impact fees 
for the improvement of "state or federal highways". This 
preclusion indicates a clear legislative intent: that the 
improvement of State Highways will be the singular 
responsibility of the State and UDOT, utilizing general 
State revenues! 
B 
PRIVATE PROPERTY PROTECTION ACT 
In 1994 the Utah Legislature, ostensibly in response to 
the growing trend towards the increasing frequency of 
"Takings Clause" incidents and the successful litigation of 
such claims e.g. Nollan (1987), First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale vs Los Angeles County, 4 82 US 
304, 107 SCt 2378 (1987) [holding county may be liable for 
"taking" effected pursuant to temporary building moratorium 
imposed for public safety purpose] and Lucas vs South 
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 US 1003, 112 SCt 286 (1992) 
[concerning "regulatory taking"] adopted the "Private 
Property Protection Act", codified at 63-90-1 et seq, Utah 
Code. 
The Plaintiff concedes that the Private Property 
Protection Act is not, per se, according to its terms, 
directly applicable to or binding upon Defendant COUNTY in 
this case. The provisions of the Act are nevertheless 
illuminating and helpful, for at least two reasons: 
1. The Court must remember that 3 5 00 South is a 
State Road, that UDOT was the "ultimate 
beneficiary" of any uncompensated dedications or 
exactions the COUNTY could require (albeit 
unconstitutionally) , and that the COUNTY was 
actually "doing UDOT's bidding", albeit 
indirectly. 
2. The legislation clearly indicates a 
legislative recognition of the "constitutional 
takings" issues which, particularly since Nollan 
was announced in 1987, have been in the forefront 
of "constitutional law", particularly at the state 
and local level. 
Section 63-90-2, under "definitions" of the Act, states in 
relevant part: 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Constitutional taking" or "taking" means due 
to a government action private property is taken 
such that compensation to the owner of the 
property is required by either: 
(a) The Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States; or 
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
(2) (a) "Governmental action" or "action" means: 
(i) proposed rules and emergency rules 
by a state agency that if adopted and 
enforced may limit the use of private 
property unless its provisions are in 
accordance with applicable state or 
federal statutes; 
(ii) proposed or implemented 
licensing or permitting conditions, 
requirements, or limitations to the use 
of private property unless its provisions 
are in accordance with applicable state 
or federal statutes, rules, or 
regulations; 
(iii) required dedications or 
exactions from owners of private 
property; or 
(iv) statutes and rules. 
(3) "Private property" means any school or 
institutional trust lands and any real or pers ,nal 
property in this state that is protected by either 
S>Q 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States or Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Emphasis added. 
Section 63-90-3, Utah Code, indicates a legislative 
sensitivity to direct that state agencies keep abreast of 
definitive court rulings on the "takings" issues, by 
providing: 
63-90-3. State agencies to adopt guidelines. 
(1) Each state agency shall adopt guidelines to 
assist them in the identification of actions that 
have constitutional taking implications. 
(2) In creating the guidelines, the state agency 
shall take into consideration recent court rulings 
on the taking of private property. 
(3) The state agency shall complete the guidelines 
on or before January 1, 1994, and review and 
update the guidelines annually to maintain 
consistency with court rulings. 
Emphasis added. The "rubber hits the road" literally in 
Section 63-90-4, which provides in relevant part: 
63-90-4. Agency actions. 
(1) Using the guidelines prepared under Section 
63-90-3, each state agency shall: 
(a) determine whether an action has 
constitutional taking implications; and 
(b) prepare an assessment of 
constitutional taking implications that 
include an analysis of the following: 
(i) the likelihood that the 
action may result in a 
constitutional taking, 
including a description of how 
the taking effects the use or 
value of private property; 
(ii) alternatives to the 
proposed action that may: 
(A) fulfill the 
government's legal 
obligations of the 
state agency; 
(B) reduce the impact 
on the private 
property owner; and 
(C) reduce the risk 
of a constitutional 
taking; and 
(iii) an estimate of 
financial cost to the state for 
compensation and the source of 
payment within the agency's 
budget if a constitutional 
taking is determined. 
(2) In addition to the guidelines 
prepared under Section 63-90-3, each 
state agency shall adhere, to the extent 
permitted by law, to the following 
criteria if implementing or enforcing 
actions that have constitutional taking 
implications: 
(a) If an agency action 
requires a person to obtain a 
permit for a specific use of 
private property, any 
conditions imposed on issuing 
the permit shall directly 
relate to the purpose for which 
the permit is issued and shall 
substantially advance that 
purpose. 
(b) Any restriction imposed on 
the use of private property 
shall be proportionate to the 
extent the use contributes to 
the overall problem that the 
restriction is to redress. 
(c) If an action involves a 
permitting process or any other 
decision-making process that 
will interfere with, or 
otherwise prohibit, the use or 
private property pending the 
completion of the process, the 
duration of the process shall 
be kept to the minimum 
necessary* 
Emphasis added. Under Section 63-90-4(2) (a), were UDOT to 
have been directly involved, the "permitting condition" 
(i.e. dedication and/or improvement of the 53-foot "half-
width") would been required to "directly relate" to the 
purpose (i.e. increased carrying capacity of the roadway) 
and would also have to "substantially advance" that purpose. 
[Obviously, the Legislature was reading and attempting to 
comply with Nollan.] 
Under Subsection 63-90-4 (2) (b) , the "restriction 
imposed on the use of private property shall be 
proportionate to the extent the use contributes to the 
overall problem that the restriction is to redress". Thus, 
the restriction (i.e. the dedication and/or development of 
the increased right-of-way of the 350u South Street roadway) 
must be "proportionate to the extent the use [i.e. the 
Westridge Meadows subdivision development: 44 homes] 
contributes to the overall problem (i.e. 3500 South traffic 
usage)". Emphasis added. 
The foregoing provisions indicate a legislative 
appreciation of the "takings" issue and an attempt to avoid 
the problem, if at all possible. Obviously, UDOT as a 
state agency is not able to as insensitive or indulgent 
(unconstitutional is a better term) than the Defendant 
COUNTY has been. Rather than even recognize and deal with 
the constitutional ramifications of Banberry, Nollan and 
Dolan, the COUNTY has chosen to ignore those cases 
administratively and legislatively in the past and 
judicially in the context of the instant litigation and 
persist in the "location-based" exactions, unrelated to any 
"impact" or lack thereof. 
The Defendant COUNTY, having been told multiple times 
before the "taking" was actually effected, has arbitrarily 
and intentionally chosen to drive forward, full-steam ahead, 
in a winner-take-all fashion, devoid of any apparent 
sensitivity of the legislative intent and restrictions 
pertinent to improving state roadways. 
When coupled with the provisions of the Protection of 
Private Property Act [i.e. the required dedications, if any, 
are to be "proportionate to the extent the use contributes 
to the overall problem"], the two statutes clearly indicates 
a legislative intention that the citizens at large, through 
UDOT, the eminent domain process available to UDOT 
(including the payment of just compensation) , and/or regular 
state tax revenues are to be utilized to acquire and 
development State Highway improvements. Placing the entire 
burden upon the back of the "highway-abutting" landowner is 
clearly contrary to statutory provisions applicable to this 
State Highway. 
Ill 
BURDEN OF PROOF PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Under the state law claims, the developer has the 
burden of proving a violation of the "constitutional 
standard of reasonableness" (i.e. that there was no 
"reasonable relationship" between the exaction or fee 
required and the needs (or impact) created by the 
development), per Banberry, supra, ["Once (disclosure of the 
information used to calculate the impact fees) is done, the 
burden of showing failure to comply with the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness in this matter is on the 
challengers." Emphasis added. Parenthesized material added 
for clarity.] 
However, for the federal claims, the burden of showing 
the "rough proportionality" (discussed below) between the 
imposed in-kind exaction and the impact created is upon the 
governmental entity. See Dolan vs City of Tigard, below. 114 
SCt at 2320, Footnote #8. Dollan requires the COUNTY to make 
. some sort of individualized determination 
that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development. 
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
other authorities cited in original Supreme Court text 
have been omitted.] The calculations previously provided to 
the Plaintiff in January 2001, only as pre-trial 
discovery and testified to by the COUNTY'S engineer 
[TRANSCRIPT at pp. 174-175] are not the "individualized 
determination" contemplated by Dolan. The Plaintiff believes 
the Plaintiff should prevail on both state and federal 
claims: the Plaintiff has established a violation of the 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" on the state 
claims and that the County has failed in its burden of 
proving the "rough proportionality" (admittedly the 
equivalent of the "reasonable relationship" standard 
followed, for the most part, by the state courts) on the 
federal claims. The Plaintiff further believes it proved 
implicitly the "federal" unconstitutionality of the COUNTY'S 
"location-based" as distinguished from the legally-
recognized "impact-based" method of imposing in-kind 
exactions for "road" purposes! 
VI 
"EQUAL PROTECTION" AND "UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS" 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND PROTECTIONS ARE VIOLATED 
BY THE COUNTY'S LOCATION-BASED "EXACTIONS" REQUIREMENTS 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides, in relevant part: *-
[Section 1] . . . nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, Section 24, of tne Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Emphasis added. 
In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982) . the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is "generally 
considered the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81 n.l. 
Although their language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and 
the Equal Protection Clause embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not 
be treated as if their circumstances were the same. See 
Baker vs Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979); McLaughlin vs 
Florida, 379 US 184 (1964) . 
In Malan vs Lewis, 6 93 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 
1984) , the Utah Supreme Court invalidating the Utah 
"automobile guest statute" illuminated and articulated the 
purposes and application of the "uniform operation of laws" 
and the "equal protection" provisions of the constitutions. 
The Court wrote: 
Whether a statute meets equal protection 
standards depends in the first instance upon the 
objectives of the statute and whether the 
classifications established provide a reasonable 
basis for promoting those objectives. 
Article 1, §24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to 
all persons within a class. Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute. If the 
relationship of the classification to the 
statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, 
the discrimination is unreasonable. Equal 
protection of the law, both state and federal, 
"requires more of a state law than 
nondiscriminatory application within the class it 
establishes . " The classification must rest upon 
some difference which "'bears a reasonable and 
just relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be made 
arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . . 
[A]rbitrary selection can never be justified by 
calling it classification." "The Courts must 
reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable 
in light of its purpose. The law under Article I, 
§24 is not different. 
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
footnotes omitted. 
The claimed "legislative classification" i.e. that 
Plaintiff, by reason of its ownership and development of the 
parcel immediately adjacent to the 3500 South Street public 
roadway, must dedicate and improve the same to the full 53-
foot half-width while a similarly-situated subdivision 
development having the same "impact" does not have to effect 
such dedication or incur such costs violates the Malan vs 
Lewis "equal protection" and "uniform operation of laws" 
principles, as follows: 
1. the required dedication/improvement DOES NOT 
"provide a reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives"; 
2. the required dedication/improvement IS NOT 
"based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute 
. . ."/ AND 
3 . the required dedication/improvement DOES NOT 
"[bear] a reasonable and just relation to the act 
in respect to which the classification is 
proposed. . ." 
See Malan vs Lewis, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, 
section 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on 
its face. What is critical is that the operation 
of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if "persons similarly situated are not 
"treated similarly" or if "persons in different 
circumstances" are "treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." 
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 669 (Utah 1984). Emphasis 
added. 
Malan vs Lewis, supra, held that Article I, Section 24 
requires that a law must apply equally to all persons within 
a class and that statutory classifications must have a 
"reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute," 693 P.2d at 670. In the instant situation, the 
only "objective" which can be advanced in furtherance of the 
COUNTY'S policy of requiring the coerced "dedication" and 
improvement to the 53-foot half-width is to AVOID THE 
PAYMENT OF THE "JUST COMPENSATION" REQUIRED BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONS! 
The required dedication/improvement, required from the 
Plaintiff when the similarly-situated, "side-by-side" 
developer of "Elusive Meadows" immediately to the south PAYS 
NOTHING, is not the "uniform operation" the constitution 
requires! The "abutting-highway" criterion for the 
"classification" is a blatant, straight-forward attempt to 
avoid the constitution requirement of paying for the 
"taking"! 
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Equal protection protects against 
discrimination within a class. The legislature has 
considerable discretion in the designation of 
classifications but the court must determine 
whether such classifications operate equally on 
all persons similarly situated. 
Thus, whether a classification operates 
uniformly on all persons situated within 
constitutional parameters is an issue that must 
ultimately be decided by the judiciary. 
576 P.2d 1297 at 1298 (Utah 1978). Emphasis added. 
In Leetham vs McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A legislative classification is never arbitrary or 
. unreasonable so long as the basis for 
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the 
purposes or objectives to be accomplished by the 
act. If some persons or transactions, excluded 
from the operation of the law, were its to the 
subject matter of the law in no differentiable 
class from those included within its operation, 
the law is discriminatory in the sense of being 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
542 P. 2d at . Emphasis added. Citation to footnotes 
omitted. 
The Defendant COUNTY would have the Court believe there 
is no "equal protection" and/or "uniform operation" 
violation because the "highway-abutting" approach treats all 
"similarly-situated" propertyowners the same: all "highway-
abutting" property owners must effect the required 
dedications and make the required improvements and all other 
(i.e. non-"highway-abutting") propertyowners don't have to 
do anything! It's that simple! WRONG! WRONG ANALYSIS! WRONG 
RESULT! WRONG! WRONG! WRONG! The Constitutions require that 
similarly-situated persons (in this case, propertyowners at 
large) be treated "equally" and "uniformly"! EVERYONE OUGHT 
TO BE REQUIRED TO CONTRIBUTE AN "EQUITABLE SHARE" TO THE 
COSTS OF THE ROADWAYS WHICH EVERYONE USES. A single group, 
regardless of how creatively or carefully defined (i.e. 
"highway-abutting"), of propertyowners cannot be 
unconstitutionally coerced to provide 100% of the costs of 
the roadway improvements, merely by reason of the 
"coincidence of geography". If such were the case namely, 
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that Government by administrative or legislative fiat (the 
so-called ipse dixit) could avoid the "payment of just 
compensation" of the Takings Clause, why don't we just give 
Government a bunch of maps and marking pens and the 
Government can "have at it"? They can draw whatever lines 
(at whatever "half-width") they choose. If the COUNTY'S 
"location based" requirement were taken to the extreme, the 
developer of a single parcel could be required to not only 
install the wider roadway improvements, but might be called 
upon to dedicate (and improve???) land for a public park, a 
fire station, a sewage treatment plant, and so forth and so 
forth. The list is conceptually endless! The development of 
a single-family residence could, conceivable, result in the 
coerced dedication of acres and acres of real estate, "for 
public use", but with any "reasonable relationship or nexus" 
between the required dedication and the actual IMPACT 
created by the development. 
In the instant case, there are but TWO CLASSIFICATION 
GROUPS: those "highway-abutting" parcels forced to bear 100% 
and those parcels which do not abut a highway (and are thus 
entitled to pay NOTHING), EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY CREATE THE 
SAME IMPACT! 
The residents of the Elusive Meadows subdivision 
immediately to the south of Westridge Meadows DO NOT merely 
hop in their car, drive down Montclair Drive almost to 3500 
South, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND GO HOME AND PARK IN THE 
GARAGE. Those "Elusive Meadows" residents DO UTILIZE 3500 
South, for which they have paid nothing! Then why do the 
Elusive Meadows people PAY NOTHING and the Westridge Meadows 
PAY EVERYTHING? 
The COUNTY argued to the District Court and the 
District Court apparently accepted that the COUNTY'S 
"classification" (of "highway-abutting" parcels versus other 
parcels) is reasonable and that the "landowner voluntarily 
placed himself into the 'classification' by choosing to 
purchase such a parcel." That reasoning is absolutely 
flawed, for at least two reasons: 
First, the County's argument stands in direct 
contradiction to the constitutional principles 
involved in the Takings Clause analysis, as per 
Dolan and Nollan and related cases. 
Second, the County's stated reasoning is 
flawed because it assumes the developer the 
instant plaintiff is necessarily the owner who 
will be adversely impact by the COUNTY'S policy of 
not paying for the roadways. Before there was the 
Plaintiff as a developer there was a propertyowner 
of the very parcel of real estate later developed 
as the "Westridge Meadows subdivision" . That 
propertyowner had rights, as a propertyowner! No 
matter how far back in time one goes as far back 
as necessary, but certainly only to 1986 when the 
Utah Constitution, with Article I, Section 24, was 
adopted one can always go back further in time 
than the County can go back to its required "ipse 
dixit" decree that the 3500 South roadway right-
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of-way "half-width" is "33 feet" OR ""40 feet" or 
"53 feet" or whatever! 
The COUNTY'S unconstitutional "decree" for the now-
understood purpose of avoiding the very constitutional 
payment of "just compensation" required by the Constitution-
--affects the rights of that primal landowner: that 
landowner simply had no choice. He (or she) already owned 
the real estate, BEFORE the COUNTY'S "decree". That "decree" 
obviously impacts the value of the owner's property, because 
it effectively diminishes the selling price of the real 
estate, because a potential developer will pay less because 
the potential developer like the Plaintiff will have to 
pay for the improvements! It is for the PROTECTION OF THE 
OWNER OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY that the Taking Clause was 
written and applied! The COUNTY cannot claim that the Equal 
Protection argument is misguided. This is not a situation 
where the Plaintiff has "voluntarily placed himself" into 
the "classification"; this is a situation where the COUNTY 
has chosen to ignore clearly-defined constitutional 
principles! 
VII 
PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 
IS WELL-PROVED AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY ANY 
UTAH STATUTORY "NOTICE" REQUIREMENTS OR RESTRICTIONS 
That the COUNTY'S "exactions" (dedication and 
improvement) requirement is pursuant to ordinance is a 
"given", well-proved (even admitted) in the trial! 
Following the Civil War, Congress adopted the "Civil 
Rights Act", presently codified at 42 U.S.C. §1983, which 
A? 
presently provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceedings for redress. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia. 
Emphasis added. 
The "Takings Clause" analysis and application per 
Nollan and Dolan, discussed above are clearly applicable 
to the case at bar. The federal "Takings Clause" is 
applicable against the Defendant COUNTY by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Chicago, B. & Q. Railway Company vs Chicago, 166 US 226, 17 
SCt 581 (1897) . 
The Supreme Court has established that local 
governments cities and counties may be held liable under 
42 U.S.C. §1983 if they enact an unconstitutional policy. 
See Monell vs Department of Social Services, 43 6 US 658, 98 
SCt 2018 (1978). See also Mood for a Day, Incorporated vs 
Salt Lake County, 953 F.Supp. 1252 (D.C. Utah 1995); Foote 
vs Spiegel, 995 F.Supp. 1347 (D.C. Utah 1998) [holding Davis 
County (Utah) liable for Section 1983 liability arising out 
of "strip search policy" upon incarceration of pre-trial 
detainees]. 
In the instant case, it is absolutely clear and 
undisputed that the COUNTY was relying upon its ORDINANCE, 
so as to require the in-kind exaction at issue! The 
ordinance represents the clearest, the most final expression 
of COUNTY on the subject. The Ordinance represents the 
policy of the County, as expressed by its governing body. 
The "color of law" element of the cause of action has been 
met. 
Is the Plaintiff entitled to be free of the 
"unconstitutional taking" effected against the Plaintiff by 
the Defendant COUNTY? Absolutely yes! Has the Defendant 
COUNTY, "under color of law", deprived the Plaintiff of its 
constitutional rights? Absolutely. 
An award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff is 
justified pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1988. 
IX 
THE COUNTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
ITS CLAIMED "EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" 
DUE TO ITS OWN UNUSED OPPORTUNITIES 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff's claims fail due to 
the claimed failure to "exhaust administrative remedies". 
This argument is misplaced for several reasons: 
First, the Plaintiff attempted to "exhaust 
administrative remedies" by appealing to the Salt Lake 
County Commission. THE COUNTY COMMISSION REFUSED TO EVEN 
HEAR THE APPEAL! [The County Commission didn't hear the 
appeal and then decide against the Plaintiff. THE COUNTY 
COMMISSION REFUSED TO EVEN HEAR THE APPEAL! The COUNTY 
cannot be heard to complain that the Plaintiff failed to 
exhaust it administrative remedies when the COUNTY wouldn't 
even consider the Plaintiff's claims of "unconstitutional 
takings". 
Secondly, the "exhaustion of remedies" requirement does 
not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. A claimant 
is not required to "exhaust state administrative remedies" 
prior to bringing a Section 1983 claim. Heck vs Humphrey, 
512 US 477, 114 SCt 2364 (1994) . See also Clark vs Yosemite 
Community College District, 785 F.2d 781 (9th Circuit 1986); 
Fierro vs Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Circuit 1996), cert 
granted, vacated 117 SCt 285. 
Thirdly, given the fact that the COUNTY summarily and 
unilaterally refused to consider Plaintiff's claims (or a 
portion thereof), the COUNTY ought not be heard to complain: 
the COUNTY should be estopped from raising this issue as a 
"defense". It was the COUNTY in the first instance which 
REFUSED TO HEAR THE APPEAL in the first instance! 
The "exhaustion of remedies" requirement is excused 
when doing so would serve no useful purpose. Here, given the 
COUNTY'S unyielding intransigence even when facing the 
Plaintiff's "constitutional violation" claims to enforce 
the COUNTY'S ordinance requiring the dedication, continued 
attempts to "exhaust" would have resulted only in the 
"exhaustion of the Plaintiff", not in any perceived benefit 
to the County or to the Court! The COUNTY had the 
development application for months and months: it didn't 
change anything. Nothing changed, even after four letters 
from Plaintiff's attorney and a face-to-face meeting with 
the Developer and with COUNTY officials (Director Bill 
Marsh, Engineer Reed Demman, and County Attorney Jeff 
Thorpe)! [See TRANSCRIPT at page 110.] In this same vein, 
the COUNTY had the case for over a year (from 1998 until 
1999!), when the development was AGAIN re-examined and 
finally approved. That's a year WHILE THE LITIGATION VvAS 
FILED AND ON-GOING. The County did nothing. 
Furthermore, the COUNTY had AN ENTIRE YEAR to consider 
the "constitutional" and related ramifications of its 
actions, even AFTER the litigation was filed: the litigation 
was filed in August 1998, following the County's initial 
rejection and denial of Plaintiff's "constitutional claims". 
But it was not until August. 1999 A YEAR LATER that the 
COUNTY finally granted final development approval for the 
subject development, albeit with the 3500 South Street 
roadway dedication at the 53-foot location. The purpose of 
the "notice of claim" provisions is to alert the 
governmental entity to the existence of the claim and to 
provide the government with an opportunity to perhaps remedy 
the situation, before it gets worse. In the instant 
situation, the COUNTY having an entire year to work with 
the Developer on the "dedication" issue consciously and 
consistently chose to ignore his "constitutional" (i.e. 
"takings") claims. 
And lastly, the Plaintiff's "state law" claims for the 
unconstitutional "taking" is under Article I, Section 22. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 22 
is "self-executing" and that statutory prerequisites 
purporting to bar or restrict such a constitutional claim 
are invalid. See Colman vs State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990) [holding Governmental Immunity Act inapplicable 
for such "self-executing" constitutional provisions and 
issues] . In the same fashion, the provisions of other state 
statutes are inapplicable to restrict and/or delay 
Plaintiff's "self-executing" constitutional claims for the 
payment of "just compensation" for its private property 
"taken or damaged for public use". See Hansen vs Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) ["Governmental immunity 
cannot apply to prohibit suit or recovery under an inverse 
condemnation theory. That would be unconstitutional under 
the interpretation we have given article I, section 22 in 
Colman."] Thus, any "notice of claim" requirements or 
restrictions cannot defeat or limit Plaintiff's "inverse 
condemnation" claims herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The COUNTY'S requirement as to the dedication and full 
improvement of the 53-foot roadway "half-width" are 
extraordinarily excessive, under terms of both state 
[Banberry] and federal [Nollan and Dolan] "constitutional" 
law. The COUNTY'S requirement contradicts clear legislative 
intention when it comes to the improvement of State 
Highways, the improvements of which are to be funded with 
State revenues and resources, and not solely by the abutting 
propertyowner. 
The COUNTY's late-created "individualized 
determination" of the impact created by the "Westridge 
Meadows" development and its "reasonable relationship" 
("rough proportionality") to those needs fails miserably. 
The COUNTY further has failed in its burden to establish 
that the required dedications are reasonably "related in 
both in nature and extent of the proposed development." 
The COUNTY has in blatant disregard of two Utah 
statutes unconstitutionally required a single property-
owner to bear substantial expenses, which by state statute 
are intended to be borne by the public at large. The 
COUNTY'S requirements, placing such a burden upon the 
"highway-abutting" developer while excusing similarly-
situated developers from any such requirement denies the 
Plaintiff "equal protection of the law" and constitutes a 
violation of the "uniform operation of law" provision of the 
Utah Constitution. 
The COUNTY has consistently claimed its actions were 
pursuant to ordinances requiring the dedication and 
improvement of the public roadway: the "color of law" 
element to the Section 1983 "civil rights claim" has been 
admitted. The "constitutional" analysis as to the "excessive 
exactions" provides the remainder of the proof for the 
"civil rights violation", for which reasonable attorney's 
fees should be awarded. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the 
District Court [incorrectly adjudicating the matter on 
"matters of law" issues] and direct the District Court to 
enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
County: 
1. Declaring the required dedications and 
exactions to be unconstitutionally "excessive" and 
to be in violation of other constitutional and 
statutory provisions, as herein described; 
2. Awarding the Plaintiff the reasonable value of 
the dedications and improvements, including the 
"severance damages" against the remainder parcel 
(calculated on the basis of the retail selling 
price of the two building lots "lost" by reason of 
the excessive dedication); 
3. Permanently enjoining the Defendant COUNTY 
from enforcing the said unconstitutional 
provisions of its roadway improvement ordinance 
against the Plaintiff and against other similarly 
situated persons or entities; 
4. Awarding, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, the 
Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees necessarily 
incurred in bringing this action. 
5. Awarding such other relief as is appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2002. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 07 UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
limited liability company, 
: 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 980908157 
VS. 
• 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the : 
State of Utah, 
: 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on April 
23 and 24, 2001. Representatives for the plaintiff and defendant 
were present and represented by counsel. The parties waived 
opening arguments. The plaintiff presented its case and rested. 
The defendant offered evidence in support of its defenses and the 
defendant rested. Following closing arguments on May 21, 2001, the 
Court took the matter under advisement. 
Since taking the matter under advisement, the Court has 
reviewed the exhibits, examined the legal authorities cited by 
counsel in support of their respective positions, and considered 
the testimony offered during the course of the trial. The Court 
being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
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frggM* AEA1Y9IS 
The plaintiff has presented this Court with a number of issues 
concerning the constitutionality of certain " in-kind exact ions," 
which the plaintiff alleges were conditions of its development 
approval. The defendant, however, has pointed out that the scope 
of the legal issues properly before this Court are substantially 
narrowed by the fact that the plaintiff only appealed the Planning 
Commission's increase in ROW requirement from 40 foot half-width 
(not 33 feet, as the plaintiff now claims) to 53 foot half-width. 
Since the plaintiff's appeal to the County Board of Commissioners 
was limited to this narrow issue, this Court is without 
jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's argument that the 
improvements it allegedly was required to make as a condition for 
approval are unconstitutional and illegal. The Court therefore 
considers only whether the defendant's required dedication of 53 
feet is constitutional and otherwise legal. 
The plaintiff contends that this case arises in the special 
context of exactions, where the defendant has conditioned the 
approval of the plaintiff's proposed development on the dedication 
of 53 feet of property for public use. Moreover, the plaintiff's 
position is that because the condition requiring the dedication of 
53 feet of property is excessive, the Court should apply the 
EXHIBIT 1 
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"rough-proportionality" test of Dolan v. Citv of Tiaard, 114 S. Ct. 
2309 (1994). 
In reviewing Dolan and Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 107 
S.Ct. 3141 (1987), the Court is not persuaded that these cases 
apply to a municipal highway dedication ordinance which requires 
dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive 
transportation scheme. To the contrary, these cases apply to a 
narrow class of cases where regulatory bodies use their police 
power on an individual and discretionary basis and in an 
extortionate manner to exact unconstitutional conditions to 
approval and issuance of development permits. In contrast, the 
highway ordinance in this case imposes the requirement of 
dedication on a broad class of property owners who choose to 
develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway. 
Furthermore, the assessment of how much property had to be 
dedicated was not individualized, but rather was made pursuant to 
the generally applicable County Transportation Master Plan and 
applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted 3500 
South. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Dolan analysis is 
not applicable to this case. 
The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiffs Equal 
Protection and Uniform Operation of Laws arguments. As stated 
above, the dedication ordinance is applied uniformly on all 
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developers of highway-abutting land. The plaintiff's argument that 
this geography-based approach treats individuals who are similarly 
situated differently is simply incorrect. For instance, the 
developers of Elusive Meadows are not similarly situated because 
their land does not abut a highway. The ordinance clearly cannot 
require such a developer to dedicate land which it does not own. 
At the same time, the developers of Elusive Meadows do not have the 
same economic advantages as the plaintiff because they do not have 
the visibility, exposure, etc. Moreover, the ordinance passes 
constitutional muster under the "rational basis'1 standard recently 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of 
Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). As the defendant points 
out, there is a "rational basis" for treating owners of highway-
abutting property differently in order to effectuate the County's 
long-range transportation plan. For the same reasons, the 
plaintiff's "uniform operation of laws" theory fails as a matter of 
law. The Court has reviewed the case of Little America Hotel 
Corp. v. Salt Lake City. 785 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1989), and finds that 
the highway dedication ordinance complies with the analytical model 
set forth in that case. 
Finally, the Court concludes that in light of evidence adduced 
at the trial, the plaintiff's theory of equitable estoppel fails as 
a matter of law. Specifically, the plaintiff could not reasonably 
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rely upon the County's "preliminary approval," It is clear after 
reviewing Section 18.12.030 of the County Ordinance that 
"preliminary" approval only gives the developer leeway to "proceed 
with preparation of specifications for the minimum improvements . 
. . and with the preparation of the final plat." The plaintiff 
could not reasonably rely on this conditional, preliminary approval 
in deciding to close the purchase of the pre-subdivision parcel. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of 
equitable estoppel. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the 
defendant on all counts. Counsel for the defendant is directed to 
prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
all in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Decision. Counsel 
for the defendant should submit the same to the counsel for the 
plaintiff for his review as to form. Any objections as to form 
should be resolved between the parties before the documents are 
submitted to the Court. Should there be objections to form of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders and Judgments that 
cannot be resolved, the objector should file the Objection, in 
writing, with the Court so that the Court will have before it the 
Objection, the proposed Findings and the Response to the Objection, 
if any, so the Court can review the Objection, the Response and the 
EXHIBIT 1 
B.A.M. V. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
proposed Findings and make a determination on any disputed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or fojnn of Order. 
Dated this ft day of June, 
I OF 
?IMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 980908157 
The Court has before it two requests for decision submitted by 
counsel for the defendant seeking a decision on two outstanding 
Motions submitted by the plaintiff. The outstanding Motions are 
the plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, and the plaintiff's Motion 
for Entry of New Findings and/or Additional Findings. The Court 
has reviewed the moving documents submitted by the plaintiff, the 
responsive documents filed by the County, and being fully advised, 
determines that the plaintiff's Motions are not well taken and 
should be denied. 
The Court is satisfied that the Motions should be denied for 
the reasons set out in the opposition Memorandum filed by Salt Lake 
County. Inasmuch as the County has properly articulated the basis 
for this Court denying the Motions submitted by the plaintiff, 
there is no need to recount those in this Minute Entry ruling. 
EXHIBIT 2 
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B.A.M. V. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel for the defendant should prepare an appropriate Order 
showing that the Motions are denied, and submit the same to the 




Dated this 1 ( day of September, 2001. 
M 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
EXHIBIT 2 
